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ABSTRACT 
“To the cloud!” trumpets a commercial by Microsoft, whose 
aim is to herd customers, and their checkbooks, into the cloud 
computing fold.  But Microsoft, and other cloud providers like 
Amazon and Google, might inadvertently be doing just the 
opposite.  It is not for lack of security or even early adopter 
apprehension that potential customers might turn away.  Nor is it a 
lack of fantastic, cost-saving applications of cloud technology.  
Rather, the problem is buried deep within these tech giants’ 
clickwrap agreements—the ones that customers rarely read and to 
which they invariably click “I Agree.”  Hidden in these agreements 
are limitation on liability clauses, veritable safe harbors for cloud 
providers and submerged icebergs for the unwary cloud customer.  
Often, these clauses wholly abrogate a customer’s right to recover 
damages for his provider’s wrongful acts.  In other words, a 
provider could purposefully delete its customers’ data or shut down 
its users’ websites, leaving the aggrieved customers with no cause 
of action and no right to recover. 
While limitation on liability clauses are not new to the contract 
law vernacular, their inclusion in cloud computing agreements is 
particularly troublesome.  The amount of potential liability that 
customers may waive through a half-cocked click is as enormous as 
it is troubling.  While courts have recently held that these clauses 
are enforceable in other Internet-related areas, courts should be 
wary of blindly applying precedent and enforcing these clauses in 
the cloud computing context.  
INTRODUCTION 
 As an April Fools’ Day joke, the British online gaming store 
GameStation made a clever adjustment to its license agreement.1  The 
                                                      
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Duke University Pratt 
School of Engineering, M.S. in Electrical and Computer Engineering expected 
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1 Catharine Smith, 7,500 Online Shoppers Accidentally Sold Their Souls to 
Gamestation, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 17, 2010, 
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modification notified customers that “[b]y placing an order via this Web site 
. . . you agree to grant [u]s a non transferable option to claim, for now and 
[forever] more, your immortal soul.”2  Just below this language, 
GameStation included an escape clause for the vigilant—by clicking a 
different button, customers could avoid forfeiting their souls and would 
receive a £5 coupon.3  Only 12% of customers managed to read closely 
enough to avoid hellfire and claim their coupons.4   
 While the clauses in cloud providers’ license agreements are not 
quite so onerous, they do snatch up rights that most cloud customers would 
certainly consider important.  One variety of clause in particular may prove 
to slow the cloud market’s growth: the limitation on liability clause.5  These 
clauses, usually buried deep6 within a cloud provider’s click-wrap 
agreement,7 limit the damages an aggrieved customer can recover from a 
cloud provider8 or dispense with a customer’s ability to recover altogether.9   
                                                                                                                         
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-o_n_54154 
9.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 For an interesting discussion on the implications of limitation on liability clauses 
in non-digital contracts, see WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS: LIMITATION OF 
LIABILITY IN CONSUMER-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 15–30 (Martin Kurer et al. eds., 
2002).   
6 See, e.g., The Rackspace Cloud Terms of Service, RACKSPACE, 
http://www.rackspacecloud.com/legal/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (including a 
“Limitation on Damages” provision in clause 17 of a 29–clause clickwrap 
agreement); Google App Engine Terms of Service, GOOGLE, 
http://code.google.com/appengine/terms.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) 
(including a “Limitation of Liability” clause in section 12 of its 17–section 
agreement). 
7 Clickwrap agreements are contracts formed entirely over the Internet which set 
forth the rights between service users and service providers.  The term “click-wrap” 
is derived from the fact that many of these online agreements require a user to click 
a button or link to agree to the contract.  Francis M. Buono & Jonathan A. 
Friedman, Maximizing the Enforceability of Click-Wrap Agreements, 4 J. TECH. L. 
& POL’Y 3, ¶1 (1999).   
8 See The Rackspace Cloud Terms of Service, RACKSPACE, 
http://www.rackspacecloud.com/legal/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (limiting a 
customer’s damages to “greater of (i) the amount of fees you paid for the Services 
for the six months prior to the occurrence of the event giving rise to the claim, or 
(ii) Five Hundred Dollars” (emphasis omitted)). 
9 See Google App Engine Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://code.google.com 
/appengine/terms.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (“Google . . . shall not be liable 
to you for any direct, indirect, incidental, special consequential or exemplary 
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 Recently, courts have begun to enforce limitation on liability 
clauses in click-wrap agreements,10 but the use of these clauses presents 
troubling new concerns because of the high value and volume of data stored 
in the cloud. By assenting to these agreements, cloud customers are clicking 
away more of their legal rights than they might think.  If these clauses—and 
the subsequent inadequacy of remedies available to customers—are brought 
into the spotlight through litigation, potential cloud customers may choose 
not to use the cloud, and current customers might reconsider their reliance 
on cloud services. In short, risk aversion could freeze the market.  To avoid 
such a scenario, courts must analyze these agreements from a fresh 
perspective while resisting the myopic temptation to strictly adhere to 
precedent.  
 Comprehending the depth and breadth of the problem caused by 
conflating basic clickwrap agreements with the cloud requires a cursory 
understanding of each of the contributing terms.  As such, Section I of this 
Issue Brief will describe cloud computing and how cloud providers and 
customers interact.  Next, Section II will discuss clickwrap agreements and 
the evolution of their enforceability in the courts.  Finally, Section III will 
analyze how the components combine to create a real problem—that is, how 
clickwrap agreements in cloud computer contracts can abrogate cloud 
customers’ legal rights.  This Issue Brief will conclude with suggestions 
regarding how the public and the judiciary can help combat this problem.  
I.  THE FIRST COMPONENT OF DISASTER: THE CLOUD 
 Identifying a precise definition of cloud computing is not easy.11 
Some have even pontificated that giving shape to the exact contours of 
cloud computing is as difficult “as attempting to capture a genuine cloud 
                                                                                                                         
damages which may be incurred by you, however caused and under any theory of 
liability.” (emphasis omitted)).  
10 See Nathan J. Davis, Note, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of 
Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (2007) (“[C]ourts have unanimously 
found that clicking is a valid way to manifest assent since the first clickwrap 
agreement was litigated in 1998. . . . [A]bsent fraud or deception, the user's failure 
to read, carefully consider, or otherwise recognize the binding effect of clicking ‘I 
Agree’ will not preclude the court from finding assent to the terms.”). 
11 See, e.g., Matthew A. Verga, Cloudburst: What Does Cloud Computing Mean to 
Lawyers?, 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 41, 42 (2010) (“As Larry Ellison, CEO of 
the computer technology company Oracle, put it: ‘The interesting thing about cloud 
computing is that we’ve redefined cloud computing to include everything that we 
already do.  I can’t think of anything that isn’t cloud computing . . . .’”); Jeremy 
Geelan, Twenty One Experts Define Cloud Computing, VIRTUALIZATION J. (Jan. 24, 
2009, 6:15 AM), http://virtualization.sys-con.com/node/612375 (presenting 21 
industry experts’ widely varying definitions of cloud computing). 
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with one's hands.”12  Nonetheless, many public and private agencies have 
attempted to do so.13  Regrettably, the federal government’s definition of 
cloud computing is anything but clear.  According to the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability 
and is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, 
and four deployment models.14  
 To the technologically uninitiated, this definition leaves much 
unanswered.  Perhaps the best way to introduce the concept of cloud 
computing is through analogy.  Think of cloud computing as a utility 
service,15 much like an electric utility service.  With an electric utility, the 
parties involved are the providers—large companies that provide the 
service—and the customers—individuals and businesses that use and pay 
for the service.  The same basic model exists in cloud computing.16  Tech 
companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are cloud providers.17  
                                                      
12 David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another 
Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 638 (2010).  
13 Geelan, supra note 11.  
14 Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15, 
NIST.GOV, (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-
def-v15.pdf (emphasis omitted).  
15 Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy 
Katz, Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica & 
Matei Zaharia, Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing, UC 
BERKELEY EECS 1 (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/ 
TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-28.pdf  (describing cloud computing as “the long-held 
dream of computing as a utility”).   
16 Some commentators discuss three parties involved in cloud computing instead of 
two.  In this dichotomy, the group labeled as “cloud providers” is further 
subdivided into “service providers” and “infrastructure providers.”  See, e.g., Luis 
M. Vaquero, Luis Rodero-Merino, Juan Caceres & Maik Lindner, A Break in the 
Clouds: Towards a Cloud Definition, ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., 
Jan. 2009, at 50, 51, available at ftp://doc.nit.ac.ir/cee/jazayeri/research%20me 
thod/a%20break%20in%20the%20clouds%20towards%20a%20cloud%20definit 
ion.pdf (describing three actors in cloud computing as service users, service 
providers, and infrastructure providers).  This further subdivision will be omitted in 
this Note because it is unnecessary to the understanding of the issues at hand and 
would likely lead to confusion.  
17 Brandon Watson, Amazon, Google, Microsoft - Big Three Cloud Providers 
Examined, CLOUD COMPUTING J. (Apr. 21, 2009, 10:00 PM), 
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Individual users and businesses that utilize the providers’ services are cloud 
customers.  
 Continuing the analogy, just as electric providers supply electricity 
to their customers, cloud computing providers supply computing resources 
to their customers.18  The scope and type of computing resources may vary 
from provider to provider, but most offer three main resources—CPU time, 
data storage, and bandwidth.19  Customers use a provider’s CPU time utility 
when they use the provider’s servers and processors to complete tasks20 like 
sorting data or compressing video files.  Customers use the data storage 
utility when they use the provider’s hard drives and memory to store their 
data.21  Finally, customers use a provider’s bandwidth utility when they 
transfer their data from an outside location to the provider’s network or 
from the network to an outside location.22 
 Cloud customers combine these three primary resources in ways 
that correspond to their business goals.  For instance, many customers use 
cloud services to host their websites.23  Others may use the cloud to store 
and manipulate scientific data.24  Amazon suggests that its services match 
well with the needs of “Pharma companies, Biotech companies, research 
                                                                                                                         
http://cloudcomputing.sys-con.com/node/746859 (describing the ways in which 
Amazon, Google, and Microsoft differ in their service offerings).  
18 See Vaquero et al., supra note 16, at 51 (“Clouds are a large pool of easily usable 
and accessible virtualized resources (such as hardware, development platforms 
and/or services.”)). 
19 See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 5 (describing Amazon cloud service’s main 
service offerings).  
20 See Conference Proceedings, Ang Li, Xiaowei Yang, Srikanth Kandula & Ming 
Zhang, CloudCmp: Shopping for a Cloud Made Easy, 2nd USENIX Workshop on 
Hot Topics in Cloud Computing (June 22–25, 2010) at § 2.1, available at 
http://www.usenix.org/events/hotcloud10/tech/full_papers/Li.pdf (“A compute 
cluster . . . host[s] and run[s] a customer’s application code.”).  
21 See id. § 2.2 (“Cloud providers . . . offer persistent storage services that store the 
dynamic application data . . . .”).  
22 See id. §§ 2.3−2.4 (“Charges for using the wide-area delivery network are based 
on the amount of data delivered through the cloud boundaries to the end users.”). 
23 Jennifer Marsman, When Does Cloud Computing Make Sense?, MSDN BLOGS 
(June 12, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/jennifer/archive/2010 
/06/12/when-does-cloud-computing-make-sense.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
24 See 1000 Genomes Project, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/datasets/438 
3?_encoding=UTF8&jiveRedirect=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (describing a 
customer’s project that uses the cloud to derive and store the human genome).  
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centers and academic laboratories”—customers that will store valuable 
scientific data in the cloud.25  
II. THE SECOND COMPONENT OF DISASTER: CLICKWRAP 
AGREEMENTS AND LIMITATION ON LIABILITY CLAUSES  
 Frequently utilized in online transactions, clickwrap agreements 
define the scope of the contractual relationship between the customer and 
service provider.26  These agreements usually contain a variety of clauses, 
some of which restrict the actions and rights of the service provider27 while 
others place limits on the customer.28   
 Limitation on liability clauses fall squarely within the latter 
category and vary widely in severity.  Some wholly abrogate a customer’s 
right to recover any damages from the service provider, regardless of the 
cause of the damage,29 while others limit a customer’s maximum possible 
recovery in litigation.30  In either case, clauses that disclaim liabilities are 
among the most controversial clickwrap agreement provisions.31 
 In the early days of the Internet, courts usually refused to enforce 
contracts that were designed to abrogate liability.32  Viewing these 
agreements through the lens of contract law, judges either held them to be 
unenforceable contracts of adhesion or found particular terms to be 
                                                      
25 Life Sciences, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/lifesciences/ (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011).  
26 Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 101 (1999). 
27 Amazon Web Services Customer Agreement, AMAZON, 
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (denying Amazon’s 
right to any intellectual property placed on its servers by its customers). 
28 Id. (claiming that Amazon can suspend a customer’s account upon nonpayment 
or breach of the contract).   
29 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
30 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.   
31 Davis, supra note 10, at 578.   
32 See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 
1991) (finding that a clickwrap agreement was unenforceable due to lack of 
affirmative assent); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 
(D. Kan. 1989) (noting that “there is some reason to question the enforceability of 
any such agreement”). 
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unconscionable.33  Recent court decisions, however, signal a jurisprudential 
shift towards a willingness to enforce these contracts.34  
 In Trieber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,35 for 
example, the court enforced a limitation on liability clause in UPS’s 
clickwrap agreement.36  The clause at issue stated that UPS’s liability would 
be limited to $100 if it lost a package of “unusual value.”37  The plaintiff in 
the case had agreed to the terms of UPS’s lengthy online agreement before 
shipping a piece of jewelry worth over $100,000.38  When UPS lost that 
package, the court held that UPS had validly limited its liability through its 
clickwrap agreement.39 The clear terms of the agreement had limited the 
plaintiff’s recovery to $100—only 0.1% of the loss suffered by the 
plaintiff.40 
 This shift toward the enforcement of limitation on liability clauses 
is particularly disturbing in the context of cloud computing agreements.  
Indeed, the $100,000 loss in the UPS case is a paltry sum when compared to 
the potential liability cloud providers could face for their transgressions in 
the cloud.   
                                                      
33 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987) 
(finding that a shrinkwrap agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion 
under basic contract law); Founds, supra note 26, at 101.   
34 See, e.g., XPEL Techs. Corp. v. Md. Performance Works Ltd., No. SA-05-CA-
0593-XR, 2006 WL 1851703 at *7–8 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2006) (holding a choice 
of forum provision in a clickwrap agreement enforceable based upon evidence of 
assent through clicking); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 336–39 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that a limitation on liability clause 
in a clickwrap agreement should be enforceable); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money 
Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389 at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (upholding the validity of a clickwrap license as a whole).  
35 Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 04-C-0069, 2005 WL 
2108081 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2005).  
36 Id. at *7–8.  
37 Id. at *4.  
38 Id. at *3–4. 
39 Id. at *12. 
40 Id. at *7–8 (holding that the liability of liability clause was “reasonable and the 
plaintiff is, therefore, bound by the limitation of liability”).    
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE PROBLEM: COMBINING LIMITATION ON 
LIABILITY CLAUSES WITH CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES 
A. The Danger: Cloud Providers Make Potentially Huge Mistakes 
 Cloud providers go to great lengths to provide reliable services to 
their customers. For instance, most providers use redundancy41  to stave off 
service outages and ensure that customer data is safe from loss. Yet despite 
these precautions, server crashes, hard drive failures, and other disasters do 
occur, and customers suffer the consequences.  In October of 2009, 
Microsoft proved just this point when its cloud experienced a catastrophic 
failure.  Mobile phone users stored their contacts, calendars, and other data 
on Microsoft’s cloud.42  After suffering a series of failures in their cloud 
facility, Microsoft sent the following chilling message to its cloud 
customers: “Regrettably, based on [Microsoft’s] latest recovery assessment 
of their systems, we must now inform you that personal information stored 
[in our cloud] almost certainly has been lost as a result of a server failure at 
[Microsoft].”43 
 More recently, Gmail, Google’s cloud-based email service, has 
proven that the dangers of data loss in the cloud still exist, even for 
customers of one of the most sophisticated cloud providers in the world.44  
Due to a set of botched software updates, over 160,000 users’ email 
accounts were deleted in February 2011.45  Although Google was eventually 
able to restore the data, their customer’s accounts were unavailable for 
days.46  Alarmingly, 85% of workers under the age of twenty-five use 
                                                      
41 Redundancy, an age-old computer science virtue, refers to maintaining a 
secondary peripheral or computer device that can take over if the primary 
component fails.  REDUNDANCY TECHNIQUES FOR COMPUTING SYSTEMS (William 
C. Mann & Richard H. Wilcox, eds., 1962); see also Is Your DAM Thinking in the 
Cloud?, HONEYCOMB ARCHIVE, http://www.honeycombarchive.com/cloud-digital-
asset-management.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (“Most Cloud services maintain 
data in up to three separate locations. This is an excellent redundancy, should there 
be an internet outage or data center disaster.  The data is readily available from the 
other Cloud locations without an interruption in service.”).   
42 Daniel Eran Dilger, Microsoft’s Danger Sidekick Data Loss Casts Dark on Cloud 
Computing, APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 11, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.appleinsider.com/ 
articles/09/10/11/microsofts_danger_sidekick_data_loss_casts_dark_on_cloud_c 
omputing.html.  
43 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
44 Gmail Failure Hits 160,000 Users – Some Still Affected, INFOSECURITY,  (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/16278/gmail-failure-hits-
160000-users-some-still-affected.  
45 Id. 
46 See Ben Treynor, Gmail Back Soon for Everyone, GMAIL BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 
6:30 PM), http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/gmail-back-soon-for-everyone 
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Gmail to send work-related emails “containing potentially sensitive 
information.”47 Users’ willingness to store such important business 
information in the cloud—together with the cloud’s proven fragility—
effectively illustrates the enormity of this budding issue.   
 While losing cell phone contact lists and emails might not set off 
too many alarm bells, companies storing scientific research in the cloud 
have much more at stake.  For example, the 1000 Genomes Project, an 
initiative aimed at “build[ing] the most detailed map of human genetic 
variation to date,” retains Amazon’s cloud services to perform computation 
on and store its research.48  The Project currently houses 7.3 terabytes worth 
of data on Amazon’s servers,49 almost as much data as the entire printed 
collection in the Library of Congress.50  The loss of this data would be 
catastrophic not only to the progress of the Project, but also to the progress 
of the science of genetics in general.    
 Similarly, companies that choose to have cloud providers host their 
websites could suffer substantial revenue loss due to potential service 
outages.  Domino’s Pizza is one such company—it is currently working 
with Microsoft to host their online pizza ordering website in the cloud.51  
To date, Domino’s has received over $1 billion in sales through its 
website.52  As a consequence, losing service for even a few hours could 
effectuate losses in the millions of dollars.  Losses could be even more 
severe if the outage occurred during a high-load time like the Super Bowl.53  
If companies similar to Domino’s acquiesce to clickwrap agreements 
containing limitation on liability clauses, those companies would have no 
                                                                                                                         
everyone.html (noting that the accounts were lost on February 27 and access was 
not restored for all until late on March 2).  
47 Warwick Ashford, Gmail Failure Highlights Risks of Web-Based E-mail, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.computerweekly.com/ 
Articles/2011/03/01/245663/Gmail-failure-highlights-risks-of-web-based-e-mail 
.htm.  
48 1000 Genomes Project, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/datasets/4383?_encod 
ing=UTF8&jiveRedirect=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
49 Id.   
50 Megabytes, Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are They?, WHAT’S A BYTE, 
http://www.whatsabyte.com/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).   
51 Marsman, supra note 23.         
52 Bob Evans, Microsoft Cloud Gets $1 Billion Delivery from Domino’s, 
INFORMATIONWEEK GLOBAL CIO BLOG (Mar. 9, 2010, 1:53 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2010/03/microsoft_cloud_ 
2.html. 
53 John Wilen, Super Bowl’s Big Day for TV, Pizza Sales, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 
2008, 5:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-01-30-
300991490_x.htm (“Domino's Pizza sales jump 30 percent on Super Bowl Sunday 
compared to a typical Sunday . . . .”). 
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recourse through which to recoup damages from their cloud providers, even 
if those providers were extraordinarily negligent. 
 Cloud service use will likely not be confined to less vital industries 
like pizza delivery for long.54  India’s Bombay Stock Exchange already 
stores some of its less critical data in the cloud and expects to serve more 
data and users from the cloud within the next five years.55  Commentators in 
England have begun clamoring for the London Stock Exchange to utilize 
more cloud services.56  Migration of American financial market data and 
trading services may soon be moving to the cloud as well.57  As such, a 
service outage for a major stock exchange would be devastating to the 
national—and possibly the global—economy.  A clickwrap-based 
restriction on recovering losses from a cloud provider who might 
negligently cause such staggering damages borders on the absurd.  
 Cloud customers with so much at stake ought to possess sufficient 
bargaining power to have limitation on liability clauses removed from their 
contracts.58  Yet small start-up businesses with significant quantities of 
valuable information do not have this luxury and are often left with a 
boilerplate clickwrap agreement.59  This begs the question: what if Mark 
Zuckerberg had originally decided to host Facebook in the cloud?  
Zuckerberg, then a college student, would have had no choice but to agree 
                                                      
54 The cloud computing market accounted for $68.3 billion in revenue in 2010 and 
is expected to grow by an extremely healthy 20% per year to $148.8 billion by 
2014.  Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Cloud Services Market to 
Surpass $68 Billion in 2010 (Jun. 22, 2010), available at http://www.gartner.com/i 
t/page.jsp?id=1389313. 
55 Penny Jones, Indian Cloud Perspectives, DATACENTERDYNAMICS (Mar. 24, 
2011), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/focus/archive/2011/03/indian-cloud-
perspectives.  
56 See, e.g., Jim Anderson, London Stock Exchange Glitch–Could Cloud Computing 
Have Saved the Day?, THE ACCIDENTAL SUCCESSFUL CIO (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:02 
AM), http://www.theaccidentalsuccessfulcio.com/uncategorized/london-stock-
exchange-glitch-could-cloud-computing-have-saved-the-day.   
57 See, e.g., NASDAQ Data-on-demand, NASDAQ, https://data.nasdaq.com 
/DOD.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (“NASDAQ Data-On-Demand is a new 
cloud computing solution . . . that provides easy and flexible access to large 
amounts of high quality and reliable historical Level 1 data for NASDAQ[], 
NYSE[], OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), Pinksheet and other regional-listed 
securities.”). 
58 Unfortunately, access to these contracts is not available to the public; confirming 
this suspicion is not possible.   
59 See, e.g., Arthur Miller Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 
685, 704 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (describing how a party with less bargaining 
power may be “in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants placed 
before him to sign”).  
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to the provider’s clickwrap agreement and would have been given 
absolutely no opportunity to negotiate.  If negligence on behalf of a cloud 
provider had then stifled Facebook’s success, Zuckerberg would have been 
unable to recover any damages.  Currently, analysts estimate the value of 
Zuckerberg’s little startup to be $50 billion.60  As such, not allowing 
startups to collect damages due to a clause in a clickwrap agreement is 
beyond the scope of allowable risk.  Given the astronomical potential 
liability that exists in this area, these clauses should be examined closely by 
the judiciary and should not be present in cloud computing contracts in the 
first instance. 
B. A Long-Term and Short-Term Solution: Information and Fresh 
Judicial Review 
 Thus far, the cloud computing market has allowed these limitations 
on liability clauses to perpetuate. The proper inquiry now is whether 
customers are aware of their diminished rights61 and, if not, whether 
customers would tolerate these clauses if they knew about them.   
 Increasing awareness, then, is a necessary strategy.  Informing 
cloud customers that they have little or no ability to recover damages 
resulting from their providers’ negligent or even knowingly wanton acts 
might lead more customers to attempt to avoid these clauses.  Further, if all 
customers knew about these clauses, they would likely be unwilling to pay 
as much for cloud services.62  In response to falling prices, cloud providers 
might relax their limitation on liability clauses or even remove them 
altogether.   
 Removal of the limitation on liability clauses would likely cause 
prices for cloud computing services to increase.  Since cloud providers will 
be more vulnerable to liability, they may charge their customers more to 
                                                      
60 Tom Foreman, How Much Is Facebook Really Worth?, (Mar. 8, 2011) CNN, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-08/tech/facebook.overvalued_1_mark-zuckerberg-
facebook-worldwide-users?_s=PM:TECH.  
61 See Smith, supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text (noting that in the case of one 
clickwrap agreement, 88% of users failed to read the online contract before 
agreeing to it).  It is unclear how many cloud customers are actually aware of their 
limited rights to sue for damages under cloud license agreements.  
62 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–65 (1984) (describing the mechanisms by 
which market prices move with inflows of new information—slower movement for 
narrow dissemination of information, faster movement for wider dissemination).  If 
high-profile litigation on these clauses occurred, then one would expect the prices 
of cloud computing services to drop relatively quickly. See id.  If, on the other 
hand, information were spread word-of-mouth, prices would not move with such 
alacrity.  See id. 
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cover the costs of future adverse judgments.  In the end, the free market will 
dictate how much the removal of these clauses is worth to cloud customers.  
For now, it seems likely that the market could become bifurcated: one set of 
cloud providers could continue to include limitation on liability clauses and 
cater to customers who do not store valuable data in the cloud, while the 
other set could remove the clauses and sell services to those who entrust 
cloud providers with valuable data.     
 Market shifts through information take time, however.  In the 
interim, the gap between full public information and the cloud market’s 
response should be filled with renewed scrutiny of limitation on liability 
clauses by the judiciary.  Indeed, the potential scope of liability assumed by 
cloud providers is much broader63 than liability found in other online arenas 
where limitation on liability clauses are routinely used.  Because of the 
disparity between potential liability in the cloud and liability in other 
Internet markets, precedent urging the enforcement of clickwrap agreements 
should not be followed by judges in the cloud context.  Alternatively, 
rejuvenation of the doctrine of unconscionability would help cloud 
customers avoid waiving their important legal rights.64  Just as courts used 
unconscionability to strike down onerous clauses during the early days of 
the Internet, the same should be done during the infancy of cloud 
computing.  In rejuvenating this doctrine, the courts might prevent harm to 
the cloud computing market while providing adequate safeguards to its 
customers.  
CONCLUSION 
 As more consumers join the cloud computing revolution and use of 
the cloud becomes ubiquitous, the likelihood of data-eliminating and 
service-interrupting mistakes by cloud providers will continue to increase.  
Unfortunately, customers who are bound by limitation on liability clauses 
through clickwrap agreements may not be able to recover any damages at 
all.  In the past, courts have been willing to enforce such clauses.65  
Nevertheless, because the customer’s potential damages in the cloud are 
much greater than in other areas, courts should examine these clauses 
closely and refuse to blindly apply precedent that is incapable of fully 
addressing the wide-ranging and unique implications of the cloud. 
 
                                                      
63 See supra Part III.A. 
64 For a good primer on the doctrine of unconscionability, see Amy J. Schmitz, 
Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006). 
65 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.  
